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ABSTRACT
Background The English National Health Service (NHS) has a long history of 
national experiments with information technology; some successful, others less so. 
The NHS England Five Year Forward View aspires to ‘Exploit the information revo-
lution’ through the transformational work of the National Information Board (NIB). 
NIB has published a ‘Framework for Action’ that promotes citizen empowerment, 
information availability, transparency, public trust, innovation, informatics skills and 
societal value.
Issue The framework sets out many laudable and common sense ambitions, 
but is light on evidence to support its aspirations, or plans for its evaluation. 
Considerable resource was invested in evaluation studies in the later stages of the 
National Programme for IT in England, but the analyses do not seem to have been 
included. Most of the cited evidence is from an unpublished report by management 
consultants rather than independent peer-reviewed work.
Recommendation National experiments of this importance should be evidence-
based and properly evaluated so that each iteration of ‘information revolution’ pro-
duces an evidence base to inform subsequent generations of care provision models 
and technology innovation. Evaluation should be planned from the very start rather 
than added in as an afterthought. Like any good business plan there should be 
defined critical success factors for health and social care, and a declaration of 
how they might be measured. Unintended consequences should be qualitatively 
explored. Evaluation should also consider critical-interpretive social perspectives to 
understand the human factors in technology deployment and should seek a theo-
retically informed insight into the mechanisms of change.
Conclusions The NHS Five Year Forward View and the NIB framework set out 
challenging ambitions based on transformative use of information technology and 
collaborative partnerships with commissioners and providers. Whilst the framework 
stands up very well against the Hayes principles, but the learning opportunities 
associated with this programme should not be missed. 
Keywords: evidence-based practice, health policy, medical informatics, 
programme evaluation
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InTRoduCTIon
The NHS England Five Year Forward View1 aspires to 
‘Exploit the information revolution’ through the transforma-
tional work of the National Information Board (NIB). The NIB 
has commendably brought together a broad spectrum of pub-
lic and patient bodies and published a Framework for Action2 
that sets out proposals based around citizen empowerment, 
information availability, transparency, public trust, innovation, 
informatics skills and societal value. These are all good aims, 
if not entirely new ones.
The NIB framework is keen to say that it is ‘not a strategy’ and 
‘not a national plan’, but represents ‘core and immediate priori-
ties’ that will be developed in a series of forthcoming ‘roadmaps’. 
The framework and the associated NHS planning guidance3 do 
seem to reflect a genuine attempt at a more joined-up approach 
at the national level (in England) and a desire to build relation-
ships with local commissioners and providers that are more 
open, collaborative and partnership based than previous central 
planning regimes have achieved. The framework also promises 
a published evidence base to support its proposals – one of the 
main points that this article addresses.
The framework is the latest in a long line of information 
strategies for the NHS in England (which it is, despite its 
 protestations to the contrary) such as ‘Implementing the infra-
structure’4 in 1994, the seminal ‘Information for Health’5 in 
1998, the well intentioned but ultimately doomed ‘Delivering 
21st Century Support for the NHS’6 in 2002 and the ‘informa-
tion Revolution’7 consultation that led to the 2012 (but already 
archived) ‘Power of Information’.8 Each iteration has contrib-
uted something, but information strategies are transient by 
nature and have recurringly fallen short of their grander aims.
ISSuE
The framework sets out many laudable and common sense 
ambitions, but is light on evidence to support its aspirations, or 
plans for evaluating the results of its experimental interventions.
Considerable resource was invested in evaluation studies in 
the later stages of the National Programme for IT in England, 
but the analyses9 are not cited in the framework’s reference 
lists. Most of the cited evidence is from an unpublished report 
by management consultants10 rather than independent peer-
reviewed work. The consultancy report was ‘commissioned 
to support this framework’, which inevitably raises questions 
about its objectivity. There is an ‘Additional reference material’ 
section that does give a bibliography of academic and grey liter-
ature relevant to each proposal heading, but it is not integrated 
into a coherent evidence-based justification. The only genuine 
evidence directly cited is the collection of research summa-
ries produced by National Voices about person-centred care.11 
However, the actual text of these digests is more nuanced than 
the rather sweeping generalisations offered by the framework 
and, curiously, this one good piece of evidence only merits 
a single incomplete sentence of comment.14p.12 Regrettably, 
the text of the framework does invite the suspicion of a selec-
tive use of knowledge from previously attempted ‘revolutions’. 
The foreword promises that an evidence base will be pub-
lished, but this only reinforces the inference that the proposals 
are primarily derived ideologically rather than evidentially.
Of course, there is a significant literature reporting vari-
ous benefits of health information technology to clinicians, 
patients and management in a wide variety of settings, but 
systematic reviews have questioned the strength and suf-
ficiency of the evidence base.12–14 Information technology 
can have negative impacts on care provision and patient 
outcomes,15–17 and there is a lack of mature measurement 
science in health informatics.18 The European Federation 
for Medical Informatics and International Medical Informatics 
Association working groups have provided sustained lead-
ership to address these weaknesses and develop health 
 informatics into a properly evidence-based discipline,19 but 
this is a long journey from where we are now.
RECommEndATIon
We first offer a brief critique of the main ideas of the frame-
work, based around the questions. 
 • What is the evidence for the central assertions of the 
framework? 
 • What is planned for evaluation?
 • How well does the framework apply the Hayes 
principles20?
Two central assertions of the framework for health and social 
care in England are that: 
1. information technology can reduce service 
consumption and operational costs; and 
2. the desired ‘information revolution’ is feasible by 2020.
Given the massive funding gap21 facing care services, 
acknowledged in the forward view, it is understandably 
tempting to assume that information technology can make 
it all better and cheaper. However, previous generations 
of health service information strategies have had similar 
hopes.
What is the evidence for the central 
assertions of the framework?
Reducing utilisation and costs
The first fundamental assertion underpinning the whole 
argument of the framework is given in its foreword and 
repeated verbatim in the NHS England planning guidance: 
‘Technology can help people use care services less by 
supporting healthier lives and it can transform the cost of 
services when they are needed’. 
What evidence supports this claim?
Under the heading: ‘There is good evidence that better use 
of data and technology improves patient outcomes and the 
value of services’, the document refers (twice) to:
1. unpublished management consultancy report - about 
potential benefits, according to its reported title; 
2. anecdotal data from an US hospital; and 
3. the national voices evidence summaries. 
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The latter sources cite systematic review evidence of reduced 
service consumption (in surgery) from improved pre-opera-
tive and pre-discharge information, conflicting results about 
telemonitoring and some evidence of the cost-effectiveness 
of home-based self-management (but with questions about 
its economic sustainability).22
Against this must be weighed other findings. For example 
the European Commission funded a study of the economic 
impact of interoperable electronic health records (EHRs) and 
electronic prescriptions (the ‘EHR IMPACT’ study). This 2010 
report evaluated the costs and socio-economic benefits of 
EHRs in nine implementations in various European coun-
tries (including local, regional and national project of different 
kinds) and concluded that: 
‘EHRs and ePrescribing are beneficial socio-economic 
investments in better healthcare, but, except in very 
 specific circumstances, need net cash injections’.23
So simply put, information technology makes things better 
but not cheaper.
Another obvious example is the large scale trial of tele-
health in England, known as the whole system demonstrator 
(WSD).24 The WSD examined effects on mortality and second-
ary care utilisation,25 organisational issues,26 cost-effective-
ness27, 28 and the perceptions of healthcare professionals.29 
The flagrant political spin on the findings of the WSD, as selec-
tively exploited by the Department of Health, is well known.30 
However, the plain fact is that the studies showed that tele-
health was not cost effective, based on a realistic estimate of 
acceptable cost per quality-adjusted life year. Again, perhaps 
better but not cheaper.
In addition, there are sometimes new inefficiencies intro-
duced by EHRs. The 2013 RAND Corporation report on 
physician satisfaction31,32 found that clinicians in thirty US 
practices agreed that EHRs improved communications, data 
access and some aspects of care quality. However, they 
mostly reported worsened satisfaction arising from time-con-
suming data entry, poorly designed user interfaces that did 
not match clinical workflow, interference with direct patient 
care, insufficient interoperability, information overload, cost, 
document templates and increased administrative tasks. 
These various inefficiencies (in some cases requiring work 
re-design to introduce a ‘scribe’ to support physician use of 
the EHR) are all tractable issues, but perhaps suggest that 
the current generation of off-the-shelf products may not pose 
a ready-made solution to health service transformation.
In another example, the effect of patient portals to promote 
self-management on service utilisation and efficiency is unclear; 
systematic reviews have reported mixed findings, whilst noting 
that a pronounced social and ethnic digital divide exists.14
There is no doubt that information technology has the 
potential to reduce transactional operating costs in many 
areas of health and social care, as in other industries, but the 
important questions are what will work in what circumstances 
and how well the transitional costs and operational changes 
will be managed. In many cases, the financial benefits are not 
likely to arise in the same organisational budget as the costs, 
so judicious whole-system management will be required.
Feasibility by 2020
The framework’s second basic proposition is that an ‘informa-
tion revolution’ by 2020 is feasible for health and social care in 
England. To support this, the framework uses the time-honoured 
analogies with simple transactional services like flight booking 
and online banking. While there are certainly ‘customer transac-
tion’ elements in the administration of care (predominantly when 
it is elective), the long slog to make progress with even the easi-
est ‘service channel’ like hospital outpatient booking33,34 surely 
shows that even changing administrative transaction processes 
in the NHS is far from a trivial piece of business change – how-
ever, tantalisingly simple the technology may seem to be.
There are serious flaws in the banking and airline analogies. 
First, the inherent richness and density of patient information 
in all its forms is orders of magnitude more complex35 than 
the simple data used in financial transactions or the instru-
mentation and logistics data used in aviation. Second, the 
finance and aviation companies have straightforward hierar-
chical management structures, unlike the fairly loose ‘system’ 
of autonomous professions and organisations that deliver 
health and social care in England. Third, both of the cited 
industries have had decades of sustained and substantial 
investment in their information technology capabilities.36,37.
Of course, Wanless38 identified back in 2002 the very low 
proportionate spending on information technology in health as 
compared to other sectors of the UK economy. The most recent 
update39 on NHS spending on information technology (not 
reported since 2009) did not show a significant improvement in 
revenue expenditure. It is unknown whether the selective capital 
financing provided through the NHS England technology funds40 
has stimulated sustained increases in revenue expenditure. The 
successes of general practice computing in comparison to hos-
pital EHRs had much to do with the incentives provided.41 
No doubt many of the ambitions of the framework are 
 eminently achievable. However, the briefly stated 2020 ambi-
tions (‘all care records digital, real-time, interoperable and using 
SNOMED CT’) seem rather far-fetched. By way of compari-
son, using a relatively straightforward information requirement, 
the ‘new’ NHS number was introduced in 19954 yet is still not 
 universally used after nearly 20 years (as acknowledged by the 
latest attempt to make it mandatory in the current planning guid-
ance3). Of course, ‘stretch goals’ are sometimes useful and no 
one would suggest an unnecessarily pessimistic or unambitious 
target. Perhaps the forthcoming ‘roadmaps’ will build confidence 
that the five year vision is achievable.
What is planned for evaluation?
With the notable exception of the experimental patient-con-
trolled mobile care record2p.25, there is a lack of any evaluative 
framework that might identify either beneficial or harmful unin-
tended consequences of this plan. Evaluation and prospec-
tive outcome measurement is only mentioned with reference 
to care data2p.34 and in a passing reference to producing evi-
dence of impact ‘using experimental and quasi-experimental 
methods’ 2p.54. The digital maturity index2p.30, a ‘census of 
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consider critical-interpretive social perspectives42 to understand 
the human factors in technology deployment and should seek a 
theoretically informed insight into the mechanisms of change.43
How well does the Framework apply the 
Hayes principles?
This journal distilled the 2009 Hayes review44 into a set of ten 
guiding principles20 and proposed they could be used to eval-
uate plans for new information technology projects. Table 1 
offers a high-level assessment of the framework using these 
10 principles.
The framework stands up very well against the Hayes prin-
ciples. Especially, in its patient-centric theme and its stated prin-
ciples of subsidiarity, the approach is encouraging. On these 
criteria, as argued earlier, its notable weakness is on evaluation 
digital progress’, seems to be the principal measure of adop-
tion and benefit. The planning guidance indicates that NHS 
England proposes to establish ‘a new operational research 
and evaluation capability’ 3p.8, but this is for the new models of 
care not for the revolutionary information changes. 
Policy makers and commissioners should want to ensure that 
national experiments of this scale and importance are properly 
evaluated so that each iteration of ‘information revolution’ pro-
duces an evidence base to inform subsequent generations of 
care provision models and technology innovation. Evaluation 
should be planned from the very start rather than added in as 
an afterthought. Like any good business plan there should be 
defined critical success factors for health and social care, and 
a declaration of how they might be measured. Unintended con-
sequences should be qualitatively explored. Evaluation should 
Table 1 Assessing the framework against the Hayes principles
Principles Assessment Comment
Patient-centred principles
The patient must be at the centre of all information systems. Excellent The framework is strongly patient-centric and its theme is 
‘personalised care’ for patients and citizens.
The provision of patient-level operational data should form  
the foundation – avoid the dataset mentality. 
Good The objective (page 32) is ‘collecting all the information 
required to support direct clinical care and the analytic needs 
of health and care, once and once only at the point of care’, 
but datasets are needed until that is feasible.
Store health data as close to the patient as possible. Less relevant This principle set out how trust was key in sharing data. The 
closer physically data are held to the patient, the greater the 
willingness to share. Maybe less relevant in the age of the 
‘cloud’.
Enable the patient to take a more active role with their health  
data within a trusted doctor–patient relationship.
Excellent The self-management aim is fundamental to the framework.
Subsidiarity principles
Standardise centrally – patients must be able to benefit from 
interoperability.
Good Adopts the forward view idea of ‘central standards, with 
explicit and extensive permissions to unleash local energy 
and enterprise’ (page 13). 
Provide a standard procurement package and an approved 
process that ensures safety standards and provision of 
interoperable systems.
Good The framework leaves procurement to local decisions: 
‘we will be tight on standards and definitions, and clear on 
expectations regarding interoperability, but we will support 
local decision-making on systems, programmes, interfaces 
and applications…[local health and care communities will] 
decide upon and procure their own solutions, provided 
they meet nationally specified technical and professional 
standards’ (page 17).
Authorise a range of local suppliers so that health providers 
can select the system best meeting local needs.
Good Proposes ‘local buying consortia’ and raises the possibility of 
replacing GPSoC with direct funding to allow greater freedom of 
choice of supplier (page 52).
Allow local migration from legacy systems, as and when  
improved functionality for patients is available.
Good This is implicit in the previous point.
Strategic principles
Evaluate health IT systems in terms of measureable benefits to 
patients.
Weak The concept of evaluation is acknowledged but insufficiently 
developed, as argued above.
Strategic planning of systems should reflect strategic goals  
for the health of patients/the population.
Good In the context of transparency, the framework says it will take 
account of work by the Department of Health, NHS England, 
Public Health England and the Local Government Association 
to ‘develop and align the outcomes frameworks for the NHS, 
public health and social care’ (page 38).
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seek guidance from published evidence and lessons from 
 previous attempts. The NIB should positively welcome the 
idea of independent holistic evaluation so that success can be 
rightly commended and failure (inevitable in any innovation) 
can be learned from.
Once again we have an excellent opportunity to improve 
the evidence-base for health and social care informatics. Let 
us hope the opportunity is not missed.
(and using the evidence from previous evaluations). It is to 
be hoped that the forthcoming ‘roadmaps’ will address these 
issues.
SummARy
The NIB framework is a political programme, and therefore by 
its nature primarily a vehicle of ideology, but the NIB should 
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